[ANSOL-geral] Análise [Re: Fwd: [ffii] European Parliament rushes towards Soviet Internet]
J M Cerqueira Esteves
Sábado, 5 de Julho de 2008 - 15:10:08 WEST
The "compromise" amendments open the door to contractual agreements
between technical operators and content producers for massive emailing
campaigns requiring the users to install surveillance and content
filtering systems. Those systems will be listed by administrative
authorities, acting under control of the European Commission, out of
effective control from the Parliament or judicial authorities.
Their further impose filters and spyware to internet users, under threat
of being sued for copyright infringement, and without any proof other
than a computer log. It's a hard version of the three-strike approach
known in France as "riposte graduée" ("graduated response").
Recital 12c (compromise amendment 4) describes the so-called
"preventive" phase of the "graduated response".
The recital states that the "relevant" administrative authorities can
issues orders to technical intermediaires imposing them to send warning
messages in case of "specific problems".
The length of this recital is exceptional for a European directive. It
contains provisions that are substantive and should never be included in
a recital (actually its contents does not belong anywhere in a
telecommunication regulation directive). It refers to the new drafting
of article 33 of the framework directive (compromise amendment 7).
This article 33 installs the principle that administrative authorities
in charge of regulating Internet usage encourage intermediaries to
co-operate with the sectors having interest in "the protection and
promotion of lawful contents". It precises that this co-operation will
in particular follow the rules defined in article 21(4a) (compromise
This notion of "personal security" echoes directly amendment 69 from
Syed Kamal adopted in the LIBE committee, which authorizes any legal or
moral person to process personal data when it is done for security
purposes. This amendment aims at the authorization to process connection
data without permission from the user and to enable the technical
measures described in amendment 76 from Syed Kamal, also adopted in the
LIBE committee. The aim is to make possible for compulsory standardised
technical systems to intercept, detect and prevent infringements to IPR,
circumventing the judicial authorities role in authorizing or completing
Article 22(3) (compromise amendment 5) plans for the standards of
surveillance and filtering to be defined by National regulatory
authorities under control from the European Commission. The procedure
defined in this article does not meet standards of democratic control.
This article 22(3) shoud be read together with recital 14b (compromise
amendment 4) that organizes a direct threat to Internet neutrality.
Technical operators would be authorized to take restrictions "for
example to enable new services". As shown by article 20b (compromise
amendment 2) and article 21(4a) (compromise amendment 3), this means to
"impose any restictions on users' ability to access, use or distribute
lawful content or run lawful applications and services of their choice".
This wording opens the door to protocols filtering and to prohibition of
some softwares which are, however, perfectly legal.
Mais informações acerca da lista Ansol-geral