[ANSOL-geral] A radical proposal to keep your personal data safe | Richard Stallman

Diogo Constantino diogoconstantino sapo.pt
Quinta-Feira, 5 de Abril de 2018 - 13:26:49 WEST


Olá,

Eu não concordo totalmente com a opinião do RMS sobre a GDPR. Eu acho 
que ele não a conhece o suficiente, mas há claramente pontos válidos na 
sua opinião e na proposta que ele faz. Mas assim como a GDPR não chega, 
aliás está a ser preparada mais um regulamento de privacidade (ver: 
http://direitosdigitais.pt/comunicacao/22-noticias/31-call-to-action-regulamento-eprivacy-privacidade-online 
e 
http://direitosdigitais.pt/comunicacao/22-noticias/44-eprivacy-carta-aberta-aos-estados-membros 
), também a proposta do RMS embora positiva é insuficiente.


Resumindo:
Não acredito que a solução passe apenas por regular uma das coisas.



Cumprimentos
Diogo

Às 13:43 de 05-04-2018, André Esteves escreveu:
> 
>   A radical proposal to keep your personal data safe
> 
> The surveillance imposed on us today is worse than in the Soviet Union. 
> We need laws to stop this data being collected in the first place
> 
> • Richard Stallman is president of the Free Software Foundation
> 
> Tue 3 Apr 2018 12.05 BST First published on Tue 3 Apr 2018 12.00 BST
> 
> 
> Journalists have been asking me whether the revulsion against the abuse 
> of Facebook data 
> <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/31/big-data-lie-exposed-simply-blaming-facebook-wont-fix-reclaim-private-information> 
> could be a turning point for the campaign to recover privacy. That could 
> happen, if the public makes its campaign broader and deeper.
> 
> Broader, meaning extending to all surveillance systems, not just 
> Facebook <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/facebook>. Deeper, 
> meaning to advance from regulating the use of data to regulating the 
> accumulation of data. Because surveillance is so pervasive, restoring 
> privacy is necessarily a big change, and requires powerful measures.
> 
> The surveillance imposed on us today far exceeds that of the Soviet 
> Union. For freedom and democracy’s sake, we need to eliminate most of 
> it. There are so many ways to use data to hurt people that the only safe 
> database is the one that was never collected. Thus, instead of the EU’s 
> approach of mainly regulating how personal data may be used (in its 
> General Data Protection Regulation <https://www.eugdpr.org/> or GDPR), I 
> propose a law to stop systems from collecting personal data.
> 
> The robust way to do that, the way that can’t be set aside at the whim 
> of a government, is to require systems to be built so as not to collect 
> data about a person. The basic principle is that a system must be 
> designed not to collect certain data, if its basic function can be 
> carried out without that data.
> 
> Data about who travels where is particularly sensitive, because it is an 
> ideal basis for repressing any chosen target. We can take the London 
> trains and buses as a case for study.
> 
> The Transport for London digital payment card system centrally records 
> the trips any given Oyster or bank card has paid for. When a passenger 
> feeds the card digitally, the system associates the card with the 
> passenger’s identity. This adds up to complete surveillance.
> 
> I expect the transport system can justify this practice under the GDPR’s 
> rules. My proposal, by contrast, would require the system to stop 
> tracking who goes where. The card’s basic function is to pay for 
> transport. That can be done without centralising that data, so the 
> transport system would have to stop doing so. When it accepts digital 
> payments, it should do so through an anonymous payment system.
> 
> Frills on the system, such as the feature of letting a passenger review 
> the list of past journeys, are not part of the basic function, so they 
> can’t justify incorporating any additional surveillance.
> 
> These additional services could be offered separately to users who 
> request them. Even better, users could use their own personal systems to 
> privately track their own journeys.
> 
> Black cabs demonstrate that a system for hiring cars with drivers does 
> not need to identify passengers. Therefore such systems should not be 
> /allowed /to identify passengers; they should be required to accept 
> privacy-respecting cash from passengers without ever trying to identify 
> them.
> 
> However, convenient digital payment systems can also protect passengers’ 
> anonymity and privacy. We have already developed one: GNU Taler 
> <https://taler.net/en/index.html>. It is designed to be anonymous for 
> the payer, but payees are always identified. We designed it that way so 
> as not to facilitate tax dodging. All digital payment systems should be 
> required to defend anonymity using this or a similar method.
> 
> What about security? Such systems in areas where the public are admitted 
> must be designed so they cannot track people. Video cameras should make 
> a local recording that can be checked for the next few weeks if a crime 
> occurs, but should not allow remote viewing without physical collection 
> of the recording. Biometric systems should be designed so they only 
> recognise people on a court-ordered list of suspects, to respect the 
> privacy of the rest of us. An unjust state is more dangerous than 
> terrorism, and too much security encourages an unjust state.
> 
> The EU’s GDPR regulations are well-meaning, but do not go very far. It 
> will not deliver much privacy, because its rules are too lax. They 
> permit collecting any data if it is somehow useful to the system, and it 
> is easy to come up with a way to make any particular data useful for 
> something.
> 
> The GDPR makes much of requiring users (in some cases) to give consent 
> for the collection of their data, but that doesn’t do much good. System 
> designers have become expert at manufacturing consent (to repurpose Noam 
> Chomsky’s phrase). Most users consent to a site’s terms without reading 
> them; a company that required 
> <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/29/londoners-wi-fi-security-herod-clause> 
> users to trade their first-born child got consent from plenty of users. 
> Then again, when a system is crucial for modern life, like buses and 
> trains, users ignore the terms because refusal of consent is too painful 
> to consider.
> 
> To restore privacy, we must stop surveillance before it even asks for 
> consent.
> 
> Finally, don’t forget the software in your own computer. If it is the 
> non-free software of Apple, Google or Microsoft, it spies on you 
> regularly <https://gnu.org/malware/>. That’s because it is controlled by 
> a company that won’t hesitate to spy on you. Companies tend to lose 
> their scruples when that is profitable. By contrast, free (libre) 
> software is controlled by its users 
> <https://gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html>. 
> That user community keeps the software honest.
> 
> • Richard Stallman is president of the Free Software 
> <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/software> Foundation, which 
> launched the development of a free/libre operating system GNU
> 
> /Copyright 2018 Richard Stallman. Released under Creative Commons 
> NoDerivatives License 4.0/
> 
> /-----------------------------------
> /
> 
> Artigo original:
> 
> https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance?CMP=share_btn_link 
> 
> 
> 
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