[ANSOL-geral] A radical proposal to keep your personal data safe
| Richard Stallman
Diogo Constantino
diogoconstantino sapo.pt
Quinta-Feira, 5 de Abril de 2018 - 13:26:49 WEST
Olá,
Eu não concordo totalmente com a opinião do RMS sobre a GDPR. Eu acho
que ele não a conhece o suficiente, mas há claramente pontos válidos na
sua opinião e na proposta que ele faz. Mas assim como a GDPR não chega,
aliás está a ser preparada mais um regulamento de privacidade (ver:
http://direitosdigitais.pt/comunicacao/22-noticias/31-call-to-action-regulamento-eprivacy-privacidade-online
e
http://direitosdigitais.pt/comunicacao/22-noticias/44-eprivacy-carta-aberta-aos-estados-membros
), também a proposta do RMS embora positiva é insuficiente.
Resumindo:
Não acredito que a solução passe apenas por regular uma das coisas.
Cumprimentos
Diogo
Às 13:43 de 05-04-2018, André Esteves escreveu:
>
> A radical proposal to keep your personal data safe
>
> The surveillance imposed on us today is worse than in the Soviet Union.
> We need laws to stop this data being collected in the first place
>
> • Richard Stallman is president of the Free Software Foundation
>
> Tue 3 Apr 2018 12.05 BST First published on Tue 3 Apr 2018 12.00 BST
>
>
> Journalists have been asking me whether the revulsion against the abuse
> of Facebook data
> <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/31/big-data-lie-exposed-simply-blaming-facebook-wont-fix-reclaim-private-information>
> could be a turning point for the campaign to recover privacy. That could
> happen, if the public makes its campaign broader and deeper.
>
> Broader, meaning extending to all surveillance systems, not just
> Facebook <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/facebook>. Deeper,
> meaning to advance from regulating the use of data to regulating the
> accumulation of data. Because surveillance is so pervasive, restoring
> privacy is necessarily a big change, and requires powerful measures.
>
> The surveillance imposed on us today far exceeds that of the Soviet
> Union. For freedom and democracy’s sake, we need to eliminate most of
> it. There are so many ways to use data to hurt people that the only safe
> database is the one that was never collected. Thus, instead of the EU’s
> approach of mainly regulating how personal data may be used (in its
> General Data Protection Regulation <https://www.eugdpr.org/> or GDPR), I
> propose a law to stop systems from collecting personal data.
>
> The robust way to do that, the way that can’t be set aside at the whim
> of a government, is to require systems to be built so as not to collect
> data about a person. The basic principle is that a system must be
> designed not to collect certain data, if its basic function can be
> carried out without that data.
>
> Data about who travels where is particularly sensitive, because it is an
> ideal basis for repressing any chosen target. We can take the London
> trains and buses as a case for study.
>
> The Transport for London digital payment card system centrally records
> the trips any given Oyster or bank card has paid for. When a passenger
> feeds the card digitally, the system associates the card with the
> passenger’s identity. This adds up to complete surveillance.
>
> I expect the transport system can justify this practice under the GDPR’s
> rules. My proposal, by contrast, would require the system to stop
> tracking who goes where. The card’s basic function is to pay for
> transport. That can be done without centralising that data, so the
> transport system would have to stop doing so. When it accepts digital
> payments, it should do so through an anonymous payment system.
>
> Frills on the system, such as the feature of letting a passenger review
> the list of past journeys, are not part of the basic function, so they
> can’t justify incorporating any additional surveillance.
>
> These additional services could be offered separately to users who
> request them. Even better, users could use their own personal systems to
> privately track their own journeys.
>
> Black cabs demonstrate that a system for hiring cars with drivers does
> not need to identify passengers. Therefore such systems should not be
> /allowed /to identify passengers; they should be required to accept
> privacy-respecting cash from passengers without ever trying to identify
> them.
>
> However, convenient digital payment systems can also protect passengers’
> anonymity and privacy. We have already developed one: GNU Taler
> <https://taler.net/en/index.html>. It is designed to be anonymous for
> the payer, but payees are always identified. We designed it that way so
> as not to facilitate tax dodging. All digital payment systems should be
> required to defend anonymity using this or a similar method.
>
> What about security? Such systems in areas where the public are admitted
> must be designed so they cannot track people. Video cameras should make
> a local recording that can be checked for the next few weeks if a crime
> occurs, but should not allow remote viewing without physical collection
> of the recording. Biometric systems should be designed so they only
> recognise people on a court-ordered list of suspects, to respect the
> privacy of the rest of us. An unjust state is more dangerous than
> terrorism, and too much security encourages an unjust state.
>
> The EU’s GDPR regulations are well-meaning, but do not go very far. It
> will not deliver much privacy, because its rules are too lax. They
> permit collecting any data if it is somehow useful to the system, and it
> is easy to come up with a way to make any particular data useful for
> something.
>
> The GDPR makes much of requiring users (in some cases) to give consent
> for the collection of their data, but that doesn’t do much good. System
> designers have become expert at manufacturing consent (to repurpose Noam
> Chomsky’s phrase). Most users consent to a site’s terms without reading
> them; a company that required
> <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/29/londoners-wi-fi-security-herod-clause>
> users to trade their first-born child got consent from plenty of users.
> Then again, when a system is crucial for modern life, like buses and
> trains, users ignore the terms because refusal of consent is too painful
> to consider.
>
> To restore privacy, we must stop surveillance before it even asks for
> consent.
>
> Finally, don’t forget the software in your own computer. If it is the
> non-free software of Apple, Google or Microsoft, it spies on you
> regularly <https://gnu.org/malware/>. That’s because it is controlled by
> a company that won’t hesitate to spy on you. Companies tend to lose
> their scruples when that is profitable. By contrast, free (libre)
> software is controlled by its users
> <https://gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html>.
> That user community keeps the software honest.
>
> • Richard Stallman is president of the Free Software
> <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/software> Foundation, which
> launched the development of a free/libre operating system GNU
>
> /Copyright 2018 Richard Stallman. Released under Creative Commons
> NoDerivatives License 4.0/
>
> /-----------------------------------
> /
>
> Artigo original:
>
> https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance?CMP=share_btn_link
>
>
>
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